Stand Clear of the Platform Doors: Imagining PSDs for the MTA

Sep 29

By: Grace Cen & Jason Zhou

In January 2022, Michelle Go was pushed onto the tracks by an assailant and crushed to death. Two months before, another Asian woman narrowly escaped death after being pushed, at the exact same station. Around 60 people have died each year for the last 2 years from a train hitting them. Why should people still die in this gruesome manner, when it is easily preventable with safety barriers? Other countries have paid for the safety of its subway riders; it is time for us to as well.

Platform Screen Doors (PSDs) are a solution to this problem. PSDs are most often clear barriers that lie between the station and the tracks themselves. This barrier contains sets of doors spaced at certain intervals, which open and close only when the train has stopped at the station. Such barriers could have prevented the deaths of Michelle Go, of Ki Suk Han, and of countless others. Because of this, we advocate for both an accelerated adoption of PSDs in the MTA, and the use of different types of PSDs when traditional PSDs are infeasible. We claim that the MTA has historically and has still currently not prioritized this solution enough, even after accounting for the difficulties the MTA has in implementing these measures.

In this paper, we first review the complete suite of benefits that PSDs provide, both intended and unintended. Afterwards, we travel to both Korea and Shanghai, which serve as precedents, to see concrete examples of their benefits, costs, and technical difficulties. Then, we justify the scale of implementing PSDs across all of the MTA, before delving into how historically the MTA has ignored PSDs as a solution. Lastly, we review the practical challenges of implementing PSDs, before looking at the current state of things and how we want the MTA to change.

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Desired Impacts:

Platform Screen doors provide many unanticipated benefits, not only improving the transit experience for passengers by reducing delays and increasing safety, but also contributing to a much better overall station environment. Here are six clear ways PSD installation would improve the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA):

Reducing Delays:

The NYC subway experiences about 900 track intrusions annually, which cause extensive service delays. In May 2018, a normal month, these track intrusions were responsible for 690 delayed trains and in 2013, the intrusions indirectly delayed train arrivals as subway drivers were instructed by their union to reduce their speeds to 10 mph when entering a station after two passengers were pushed onto the tracks. PSDs prevent these track intrusions and their corresponding delays by acting as a plexiglass barrier between passengers and the train tracks, only allowing riders to step forward when the train has fully arrived at the station. Their installation could also prompt a re-evaluation of train speeds, potentially allowing trains to enter stations at higher speeds. Similarly, by blocking riders from the tracks, PSDs also prevent trash or important personal belongings from falling on the tracks, which are fire hazards and can result in additional delays or, in extreme cases, lines being rerouted, a further inconvenience.

Preventing Suicides, Falls, & Hate Crime Related Accidents:

PSDs prevent accidental falls, which becomes especially important in stations prone to platform crowding and in the context of the recent uptick in hate crimes in New York. During rush hours, people on indoor platforms are prone to pushing, slipping, and falls, and in colder months, outdoor stations may ice over and become slippery. By physically separating the station from the tracks, PSDs act as a powerful preventative measure.

PSDs physically stop people from jumping and being pushed onto the tracks, reassuring widespread fear of hate crimes. This January, 40-year-old Michelle Alyssa Go was shoved to her death onto the Times Square-42nd Street station tracks by a homeless man. In the same month, a 62-year-old man was pushed onto the Fulton Street station tracks. There are also about 40 NYC suicides every year committed by platform jumping. In 2020, there were 169 recorded collisions of trains and people — 63 of them were deadly. These numbers are regular for the MTA; in 2019, the MTA recorded 62 fatalities. Sarah Feinberg, former interim New York City Transit President, shares that a train collision with a person is “not only absolutely devastating for the victim but also traumatic for train operators” (Washington Post). Such accidents have elicited valid concerns in both riders and operators over the safety of subway stations. If PSDs can prevent deaths, they should be unequivocally worth the cost.

Reducing Litter Build Up (Fire Risk):

By preventing trash from being nonchalantly thrown onto tracks, PSDs can significantly reduce the number of annual fires on them. Annually, around 700 fires on train tracks can be traced back to thrown trash, causing major reductions of service. For example, in May 2018, 726 trains were delayed due to track fires caused by litter. These track fires place additional burden on MTA, who must put out the track fires quickly and strategize potential new train paths and solutions ad hoc. This is both a financial and operational toll and can be greatly relieved with the installation of PSDs.

Improving Air Quality:

Research shows that PSDs reduce the fine dust passengers are exposed to and thus improve platform air quality. New York City stations have a striking problem with high pollution levels. MTA subway stations average 251 micrograms of PM2.5 per cubic meter, over 7 times higher than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standard of 35 micrograms per cubic meter. According to the NYU Grossman School of Medicine, while this does should not cause adverse health effects to general riders who spend 15 minutes or less on a platform waiting for a train, it “likely poses a significant health risk to individuals with preexisting respiratory health conditions such as asthma, for commuters and workers alike" (Curbed). PSDs offer a potential solution to this problem. In a paper published in 2020 that measured contaminant concentrations in a train station in Seoul, Korea before and after the installation of platform screen doors (PSDs), researchers found that concentrations of a particulate pollution called PM10 of platforms were significantly reduced after the PSD installation.

Reducing Noise Pollution and Risk of Hearing Loss:

These doors reduce background noise from trains entering and exiting stations linked to hearing loss. One study in Japan found that both full height and half height PSDs reduced train noise levels by 2 dB and 1 dB respectively as a train approaches an above ground station. In underground stations, full height PSDs reduced the train noise level by approximately 5 dB when a train approached and 3 dB when a train left. Japanese trains are notoriously quieter than MTA subways, suggesting that PSDs might even have greater reductions in noise in NYC stations where the baseline of noise pollution is louder, and a problem. The Hearing Health Foundation found the NYC subway to be an “auditory minefield” (Hearing Health Foundation). Average sound levels on subway platforms were between 72.5 and 76.5 dB, and maximum readings went as high as 119 dB on platforms just as the train pulled into the station. According to the World Health Organization and EPA, noise-induced hearing loss can occur after 160 minutes of exposure to noises around 80 decibels but less than thirty seconds of exposure to noises around 110 dB. PSDs would help decrease the risk of stations causing noise-induced hearing loss for both riders and transit workers.

In addition, by installing PSDs, the aforementioned platform noise reduction will also improve the sound quality of platform announcements. Train noise currently reduces the speech coherency of public address systems in stations, annoying many New Yorkers, as humorously pointed out by John Crudele in a New York Post article titled, Why don’t conductors realize subway announcements are impossible to hear?.

Improving climate control:

PSDs help station heating and ventilation systems operate much more efficiently, which is especially important during hot days in New York. In the summer, underground stations in New York are usually much hotter than the corresponding above ground temperatures. For example, The Regional Plan Association found that on an 86 degree fahrenheit August day, average platform temperatures were 94.6 degrees. The highest temperature that day was 104 degrees at the Union Square downtown 4/5/6 platform. Beyond being a nuisance for riders, the heat also poses a serious health risk. The NYC Health Department states “A heat index above 95°F is especially dangerous for older adults and other vulnerable individuals.” By considering the source of the underground heat, the usefulness of PSDs can be understood. The air conditioning of subway cars in emit hot air into stations, while train breaks also produce heat through friction. Thus, a barrier between the train and platform would substantially help reduce the heat in stations.

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Unintended Ramifications:

Installing PSDs in the MTA also has unintended ramifications, beyond the desired impacts discussed above. First, it leads to job creation, both short-term jobs for constructing the doors, as well as long-term jobs for those who maintain PSDs. This is especially important during an economic downturn. Subway drivers must also now engage in additional training, understanding what to do to stop trains at exact points in the station, as well as in the case of an emergency.

Additionally, the overall increased quality of service that PSDs provide can lead to other positive effects. First, it may attract potential drivers to use the subway more, decreasing the impact of cars on the environment. Also, PSDs can increase the equality of ease of access to subways; for example, the legally blind may not have wanted to use subways originally due to the risk of falling onto the tracks. But, now, with PSDs, they may feel like they can safely use the subway. The reduced amount of fatalities in subways can also reduce the psychological stress both subway drivers and riders experience.

If the MTA installs PSDs, it may encourage change in its own governance and also encourage other North American subways to consider PSDs as well. If implemented, it may become a political signal that the MTA is finally open for other degrees of change, such as potentially hiring traffic agents or eliminating the speed limit for trains. The introduction of PSDs in particular will require the MTA to implement a plan aligned with national laws. Instead of starting from scratch, other cities that consider PSDs can then first alter the MTA’s implementation plans, from budgeting and resourcing producers to public rollout. This reduces the governance of implementing PSDs. Additionally, other cities can look towards MTA to see how well PSDs perform in North America. If the MTA performs well, it can be an additional argument that could encourage other subways to implement PSDs.

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Precedents:

As PSDs are not new, we should look globally to further learn about their ramifications, both positive and negative. Indeed, PSDs are common in Europe and Asia – almost everywhere except North America. Therefore, it is important to look back at a few examples to see how PSDs came to be, how it helped their respective communities, and the issues surrounding them as well. In particular, we will focus on two cases: the rise of PSDs in South Korea, in particular Seoul, and the usage of PSDs in Shanghai.

South Korea decided to build PSDs due to suicide and arson problems. Suicide is the 5th leading cause of death, killing 26 out of every 100,000 people. South Korea ranks first out of all OECD counties in terms of deaths. This may have increased fatalities in the subway systems. In 2003, in Seoul itself, 70 people died in the subway system, although the cause is unclear. Nevertheless, the potential for PSDs to prevent suicides was able to bring this technology to the limelight. Additionally, in 2003, an arsonist on the Seoul subway killed 198 and injured 150, bringing into the limelight a need for additional protection in the subway station, especially as the subway in Seoul accounted for 34.6% of trips in 2002. Thus, the stage was set for a revamping of the subway system and the inclusion of PSDs. This led to the creation of the Seoul Subway Safety Project, which, among other things, included the installation of PSDs.

Once all the doors were installed at all stations by 2009, the impact was immediately seen through the data. In 2010, only 2 deaths occurred in the subway, with 0 suicides. An increase in air quality was also observed, with a reduction of 16% of PM10 concentration, and 12% of PM2.5 concentration. These particles are irritants and can also be potentially dangerous, especially for those with asthma. Additionally, the official think tank of South Korea also reports that it has reduced noise, train wind, and can help the prevention of fire spread. This aggregration of positive effects only reinforce the idea that PSDs will help us achieve our own goals.

Yet, in South Korea, PSDs are not without its faults. Because the doors were badly built without a maintenance team, there has been over 70,000 mechanical failures since 2013 at over 700 stations. Additionally, seven people have been killed due to these doors themselves. While this is well-recognized, both the subway and rail systems overall are caught in a bind due to its lack of funding. In 2014, seven out of nine Seoul subway lines gave rise to a 372 million dollar deficit in 2014. Around 70% of these losses came from free rides given to the elderly and disabled. Currently, with the additional effect of COVID, the overall deficit of the Seoul subway system in particular is reaching 1.75 billion dollars. Even the current basic fare does not cover the cost of transporting the individual: the fare is currently only 1250 won, while the cost to transport an individual is on average 2050 won, making the subway system lose around 60 cents per customer. Thus, while the PSDs are breaking down, it is understandable why it has yet to be addressed – the Seoul subway system just currently does not have the money to do so. Likewise, many railways and train stations that are meant to connect different cities in Korea have also slowed down their building of PSDs. In 2013, only four stations got new screen doors, leading to only 58 of the 223 stations which are managed by KORAIL have screen doors. KORAIL is the national railway operator in South Korea. By comparison, all privately funded railways had PSDs installed by 2009.

The issue of PSDs stemming from the lack of funding is hard to change. Focusing on Seoul, politically, nobody wants to increase the toll, especially when so many people use the Seoul subway system for both work and recreation. Yet, additionally, nobody wants to stop giving free subway tickets to the elderly and disabled, for whom it may be the sole way to get around town. From this, we learn that PSDs must be considered as a long-term solution to subway fatalities and other problems, with a full plan to obtain funding first for its construction and then for its maintenance.

The precedent in Shanghai, China, only reinforces the positive benefits of PSDs while also highlighting the potential downside of them, even with extreme precautions. Just like in Seoul, it began installing PSDs around 2003, with the original intent to reduce accidents. People used to fall into the railway or tunnels once every two days. The effects of accidents led to a public outcry in 2012 for full PSDs. These PSDs potentially allowed train stations to save around 20% on electricity as it blocks heat from the trains, and by 2019, data showed that full height PSDs reduced suicides by around 90.9%. By this time as well, it was recorded that nearly every train station in Shanghai had a full PSD. This additional example of the positive effects of PSDs, as well as the new positive effect of saving electricity, further shows the potential of PSDs. Yet, even with good maintenance and funding, PSDs are not perfect. In January 2022, a passenger was killed by the closing sliding doors. This was when the doors already had an anti-pinching function, showing that even with the utmost care, there is still a risk. While this risk is difficult to mitigate, by making people aware of this, we can potentially lower the chances of this happening. Additionally, Shanghai’s metro system serves a much larger amount of people: they served around 3.6 billion passengers in 2021, while the MTA only served 760 million. Thus, this risk may already be lowered by the significantly smaller amount of customers the MTA serves.

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Justification of Scale:

While we now understand the usefulness of PSDs, the MTA serves as a perfect scale for their introduction. First, it is extremely high impact; in 2021, around 25% of trips to work use MTA in NYC and the broader area. Additionally, from the political viewpoint, the technical governance structure allows for the potential to target the MTA as a whole. The MTA is governed by a single 21-member board, allowing the easy dissemination of these doors across the whole system. Additionally, the board’s voting power primarily lies within the governor and mayor’s appointees, so it is possible to bring in appointees who support PSDs over time through convincing fewer people. Lastly, if the MTA is able to successfully implement PSDs, its position as the busiest rapid transit system in North America could potentially ease the political and cultural costs of other US cities following suit.

It does not make sense to set a smaller target. Because the MTA is well-connected, if the doors only exist on a few stations, many of the benefits are lost. For example, if on a single line, a train arrived at a station late due to a preventable cause from PSDs, then the train would carry on the delay to the stations afterwards. Additionally, if an individual had the intent to suicide on the subway, they would potentially be able to ride to a station without PSDs first. If the PSDs are only implemented on a few lines, there is still the additional issue of equality. Because different lines naturally tend to serve different communities, it is unfair for the benefits of PSDs to be primarily given to some communities over others. Therefore, it is important that when PSDs are rolled out, they are rolled out on the whole system.

Additionally, while optimal, it is difficult to consider PSDs for the larger transit network in NYC. Some forms of transportation, like buses, do not face the same issues as subways. PSDs can be installed for commuter rails and Amtrak stations, such as Penn station, the busiest railway station in 2022. Some issues, such as suicide prevention and the corresponding psychological damage, also exist for these railways. Yet, the completely separate governance structure by a semi-private national corporation (Amtrak) makes it more difficult to instate change than a public board. Additionally, the amount of fatalities aggregated across all US railroads is less: across all railroads, for non-trespassers, less than 20 fatalities occurred in 2021 that were not due to highway-railroad accidents on or near the track. On the other hand, in the first eight months of 2021, around 50 fatalities occurred in the MTA. The scale is significantly larger for the MTA, and due to the uniquely vast system of US railroads, while it is best if railroads also had PSDs, it at first seems better to push for the MTA to install PSDs due to the larger impact it can have.

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MTA’s History With PSDs:

While historic precedents show how effective PSDs can be, the MTA historically has resisted PSDs through many ways. Broadly, the MTA itself was stuck in a cycle of inaction: often, plans for a new station or a publicized violent death on the tracks spark renewed public interest in platform sliding doors. Then, the MTA, with its reactionary mindset, spends time considering the possibility of platform doors. Afterwards, the interest dies down, the MTA fails to implement any plan of action, and the cycle resets.

The MTA considered PSDs in the 1980s and 1990s, although in the end they scrapped the idea due to the inconsistent MTA system. In 2007, there was consideration again of PSDs for the new 2nd Avenue Subway Platforms, but they were again rejected due to concerns of how trains were able to exactly align with the PSD doors: unlike the MTA, most stations with PSDs are newer and therefore also have computers which help align the trains. As we see later, this is one of a large set of excuses that the MTA brings up in order to avoid action. Notably, by this point, a company by the name of Crown Infrastructure offered to build PSDs and maintain them for the contract length for free in exchange for advertising rights. While unimportant now, this becomes important in 2012.

By 2013, the MTA again reviewed the idea of PSDs. In December 2012, two people were pushed onto tracks and killed, one of which was Ki Suk Han, whose photo right before his death was published in the papers. This extreme publicization of his gruesome death, which was caused by somebody pushing him onto the tracks, caused a renewed public interest in PSDs. Yet, instead, one excuse brought up by journalists was the debt of the MTA, who at the time had a 2 billion budget deficit. Yet, this tireless excuse was invalid; by this point, Crown Investments was still interested in building PSDs with the same deal as in 2007. Additionally, in practice, the MTA bureaucracy did not even study the potential of PSDs. An alternative excuse that the MTA provided, that their non-uniform trains will likely cause issues with PSDs, makes significantly more sense, but it is hard to place good faith on the MTA given their other aforementioned behavior. Due to the potential issue of killing individuals, they instead thought about solutions that pitted the benefits of some against others: they thought about slowing trains down, which potentially gives more time for the train driver to stop the train. But, even at that time, they also understood it potentially reduces the amount of trains run by 30-40%. Instead of resolving a long-term issue through the thoughtful investment and changing of the system, they decided to implement a placating solution at the cost of the time of other commuters, where to this day, many are still killed. To this day, this solution is still in place; trains are slowed down to 10 miles an hour.

In 2017, there was a unique case where it was unclear why the MTA decided to consider PSDs again. Nevertheless, they considered to test out a PSD at an L station. Yet, even then, history repeats itself; soon after, in 2018, the plan was scrapped for building more elevators. The excuse that the New York City Transit President (who joined after pilot program was announced) gave was unsatisfactory at best; he claimed that elevators that help with accessibility just seemed more important at the time. This again repeats a previous strategy in the MTA playbook, where they pit those who have suffered without PSDs with the disabled. Instead of appearing to favor one over the other, the MTA should try to help both groups. An additional excuse made by the same president was that PSDs had uncertain benefits, unintentionally exposing the unthoughtful process for which the MTA has considered PSDs as a solution before then.

In summary, the MTA has been extremely resistant to PSDs, dodging responsibility and using unsavory political techniques such as pitting different groups against each other and not doing due diligence on the solution itself. Additionally, besides in 2017, it has been extremely reactionary, instead of proactively trying to help those who were killed every year in the first place.

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Challenges and Roadblocks:

Even if the MTA were to properly prioritize this project, they would have to address many practical challenges to implementation. In particular, they must overcome the difficulties of acquiring the cost for both the initial installation and reinforcement, upgrading their current facilities, adjusting and reinforcing large scale platforms, abiding by ADA requirements, allocating room for PSD control equipment, linking additional power lines, and overcoming political roadblocks. These are logistically made more difficult because MTA management in particular has historically failed to bring their technology up to speed. Thus, the upgrades to the platforms and making the train fleet uniform, actions that should have been made long ago, must now be factored in as part of the preliminary costs of this project.

Door fleet misalignment is an often cited roadblock, and one that can be overcome with vertical PSDs or standardization of train cars. The MTA recently published a System-wide PSD Feasibility Study, claiming that PSDs can only be utilized at 41 stations out of 472 stations, but this only shows their inattention to understanding the other types of PSDs out there. The MTA subway system currently features train cars with three different types of door alignment. This lack of uniformity with regards to distribution of doors makes the use of narrow horizontal PSDs at the other 431 stations, where these trains with different car door spacings pull into, infeasible. Additionally, even if the train cars have the same door alignment, traditional PSDs require advanced signaling to ensure that trains will stop at the same place each time they pull into a station, which New York trains notoriously lack due to the delay of long-due upgrades. However, the report fails to consider vertical PSDs which has the distinct advantage of offering broader access of over seven meters, so that trains do not have to make as highly precise stops nor must they have the same spacing of doors. These vertical PSDs also bring similar benefits as traditional PSDs to their respective communities. Barcelona, for example, implemented these in 2019. Alternatively, if the MTA is able to homogenize car door spacing of all train cars, which it could do instead but would take much longer [experts say it would take until 2033], this would make 128 of 472 NYC stations ready for installation, more than three times the opportunity for PSDs than the MTA predicted.

Cost is another barrier towards implementation. According to the MTA, just the design, construction, and installation of full or half platform screen doors for 128 of 472 NYC stations will cost 7.01 billion and 6.53 billion dollars, respectively. Approximate yearly maintenance costs would be an additional 119.16 million dollars for either. The MTA also mentions that the doors may require platform edge reinforcement, electrical upgrades, and a new interface between trains and signals. Setting aside this type of capital budget will be difficult. Politically, MTA funds have been historically and consistently raided by the government, whether it be through bond issuance fees (where the MTA was underfunded by NY state but still charged every time they issued a bond) or the long string of NYC governors utilizing funds as a state piggy bank. But, one possible solution to this is to convince the state government of the importance of PSDs. Through research reports like these, and with additional concrete economic research on PSDs, there is potential to show the state government that the relative value of lives saved and reduction of delays from platform doors is higher compared to other potential investments, and therefore it is necessary to install PSDs.

Adding PSDs to 34% of the remaining 344 stations is currently infeasible because of the additional room needed for the barriers and equipment room needed to satisfy ADA requirements. Obtaining ADA clearance for PSDs is difficult because the platform barriers are 15 inches thick, and when they are installed close to the platform edge, they can further constrain the available space around a staircase, wall, or railing. Many existing NYC stations are too narrow and do not pass current ADA restrictions. If new PSDs are installed into these older stations, they would further “Limit the ability of a wheelchair to turn within a 5’-0” circle” or “Limit path of travel to less than a 32” pinch width” or “Limit path of travel to be less than a 36” corridor as defined by the edge of a staircase, railing or room”. There is also the challenge of creating sufficient space for a PSD equipment room to house appropriate control and monitoring panels. These equipment rooms can either take the form of a long 7’-6” x 27’ room or two smaller 7’-6” x 17’ rooms. Yet, due to ADA requirement violations, the MTA already needs to renovate many subway stations in the near future. While doing so, they could plan for the additional room PSDs would take.

Many old platforms are currently also unable to support the weight of PSDs. On 1 line stations, for example, the elevated platforms are covered by frail precast panels, and therefore a naive application of PSDs would require a full replacement of this platform. Yet, the MTA again does not consider other forms of PSDs: these structural concerns can be mitigated with waist-high barriers or lighter platform rope barriers utilized in South Korea. While these alternatives only provide a fraction of the benefits of full PSDs, they would also be cheaper, perhaps partly relieving also the issue of costs. For example, a Korean manufacturer roughly estimates that rope screen doors could be installed at half the price and 1/3rd the time of a standard PSD.

Overcoming any of these obstacles will be difficult and requires consistent commitment and proper monetary contribution from both the MTA and NYC Governor so that PSD installations do not halt halfway or deteriorate. In particular, if history is any sign of the future, we need to ensure that there is a repeat the PSD pilot plan in 2017-2018, where a change of helm caused the pilot to stop. Nevertheless, there are already well-known and well-designed solutions to all of these practical problems: it lies in the hands of the government to just recognize that the need of PSDs goes beyond political costs, and to implement these solutions.

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MTA’s Belated PSD Plan:

In current times, we should lightly applaud the MTA for finally beginning to seriously consider PSDs, starting a pilot program for them at three stations, even though the program was in response to Michelle Go’s death. In some ways, her death and the clarity of its motive as a hate crime cleared the congested political costs for finally pushing the program through. Additionally, almost a year later, abysmal progress has been made; as of July 13, 2022, the MTA was still looking for a PSD contractor for a pilot program for three stations. The original offer provided by Crown Infrastructure in 2007 and 2012 is now nowhere to be heard in the news. Projections for the project anticipate that it will not be complete until 2024. This painful pace only highlights the impotence that the MTA places on these projects.

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Conclusion:

Therefore, in light of all our research, we advocate for a faster transition by the MTA towards large scale installations of various types of PSDs in all stations, even beyond those involved in their 2024 pilot program. There are currently 41 stations considered feasible targets for these doors, 128 after factoring in vertical PSDs, and many more elevated platforms could currently benefit from lightweight rope PSDs; It does not make sense to wait until 2033, when the MTA claims to plan to finish standardizing their train fleet by, to start the mass implementation of PSDs. The need for them is evident now. By then, the public push for PSDs may have subsided as it has in the past. We must utilize the galvanizing energy for PSDs now to push for piloting of lightweight rope PSDs, vertical PSDs, and half height PSDs. After all, it is preferable to have any type of barrier as opposed to having no barrier at all.

From saving lives that otherwise would be lost from track falls, either accidental or in suicide, to enhancing the experience of waiting at the platform, PSDs provide an abundance of yet unrealized benefits to New York subways. These plexiglass barricades are already the norm for train stations in Asia and across Europe and it is clear: when governments invest in the safety of their public transit, usage is higher, less accidents happen, and the trains run faster. It is time for New York City to do the same. Amongst the 20 largest major rapid transit systems in the world, New York’s trains now rank the lowest for on-time performance. It is due time to start prioritizing public transit and help NY trains catch up to their international counterparts. The MTA has ignored PSDs for far too long and now, continues to only inching towards completion of a pilot program. There certainly are practical challenges of implementing PSDs on an entire MTA scale such as cost and making platforms both wider and able to support weight, but we believe these challenges are ones that must be addressed anyhow as the MTA moves towards renovating stations to be ADA compliant.

In terms of actionables, PSD implementation will be much easier if we elect governors who see PSDs as an integral next step and are willing to publicly speak on them, so the press is at least to hold them accountable for the completion of these doors. New York City politicians often have metropolitan pet projects such as the construction of a new station, which they champion at the end of their term as their gift for New Yorkers and legacy. For example, Sheldon Silver successfully pushed through a billion dollar plan for the completion of Fulton Street station amidst a deterioration of the subways core components like outdated signals, or take Bloomberg’s blue bikes for another. We see PSDs as a great potential pet project for candidates for governors, especially if there is a guaranteed press day attached to the finished installation of PSDs in each station.

The difficulty of implementing platform screen doors also reveals a deep seeded problem of the MTA being more reactionary than proactive, part of the reason why they have not fully recovered their pre-covid ridership numbers. In 2019, subway ridership on an average weekday was 5,493,875 and in 2021, numbers still lingered around 2,369,655. The MTA is iconic to the New York experience, and if we gain back ridership, the city must gain back trust in the safety of the MTA.